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Abstract
The 01 loss is robust to outliers and tolerant to
noisy data compared to convex loss functions. We
conjecture that the 01 loss may also be more ro-
bust to adversarial attacks. To study this empiri-
cally we have developed a stochastic coordinate
descent algorithm for a linear 01 loss classifier
and a single hidden layer 01 loss neural network.
Due to the absence of the gradient we iteratively
update coordinates on random subsets of the data
for fixed epochs. We show our algorithms to be
fast and comparable in accuracy to the linear sup-
port vector machine and logistic loss single hid-
den layer network for binary classification on sev-
eral image benchmarks, thus establishing that our
method is on-par in test accuracy with convex
losses. We then subject them to accurately trained
substitute model black box attacks on the same im-
age benchmarks and find them to be more robust
than convex counterparts. On CIFAR10 binary
classification task between classes 0 and 1 with
adversarial perturbation of 0.0625 we see that the
MLP01 network loses 27% in accuracy whereas
the MLP-logistic counterpart loses 83%. Simi-
larly on STL10 and ImageNet binary classifica-
tion between classes 0 and 1 the MLP01 network
loses 21% and 20% while MLP-logistic loses 67%
and 45% respectively. On MNIST that is a well-
separable dataset we find MLP01 comparable to
MLP-logistic and show under simulation how and
why our 01 loss solver is less robust there. We
then propose adversarial training for our linear 01
loss solver that significantly improves its robust-
ness on MNIST and all other datasets and retains
clean test accuracy. Finally we show practical ap-
plications of our method to deter traffic sign and
facial recognition adversarial attacks. We discuss
attacks with 01 loss, substitute model accuracy,
and several future avenues like multiclass, 01 loss
convolutions, and further adversarial training.
1Department of Computer Science, New Jersey Institute of
Technology, Newark, NJ 07102, USA. Correspondence to: Usman
Roshan <usman@njit.edu>.
1. Introduction
Adversarial attacks present a challenge to machine learning
algorithms typically based on convex losses. State of the art
classifiers like the support vector machine (Cortes & Vapnik,
1995) and neural networks (Krizhevsky et al., 2012) achieve
high accuracies on test data but are also vulnerable to ad-
versarial attacks based on minor perturbations in the data
(Goodfellow et al., 2014; Papernot et al., 2016b; Kurakin
et al., 2016; Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Brendel et al., 2017).
To counter adversarial attacks many defense methods been
proposed with adversarial training being the most popular
(Szegedy et al., 2013). This is known to improve model
robustness but also tends to lower accuracy on clean test
data that has no perturbations (Raghunathan et al., 2019;
Zhang et al., 2019; Raghunathan et al., 2019).
The robustness of outliers to the 01 loss is well known
(Bartlett et al., 2004). Convex loss functions such as least
squares are affected by both correct and incorrectly classi-
fied outliers and hinge is affected by incorrectly classified
outliers whereas the 01 loss is robust to both (Xie et al.,
2019; Nguyen & Sanner, 2013). In addition to being ro-
bust to outliers the 01 loss is also robust to noise in the
training data (Manwani & Sastry, 2013; Ghosh et al., 2015)
and under this loss minimizing the empirical risk amounts
to minimizing the empirical adversarial risk (Lyu & Tsang,
2019; Hu et al., 2016) with certain assumptions of noise. We
conjecture that these properties may translate to robustness
against black box adversarial attacks that typically succeed
in fooling state of the art classifiers (Papernot et al., 2017).
To test this we first develop stochastic coordinate descent
solvers for 01 loss based upon prior work (Xie et al., 2019).
We also extend the previous work to a non-linear single
hidden layer 01 loss network that we call MLP01. For the
task of binary classification on standard image recognition
benchmarks we show that our linear 01 loss solver and the
MLP01 loss are both as accurate as their convex counter-
parts, namely the linear support vector machine and the
logistic loss single hidden layer network. We then subject
all methods to a substitute model black box attack (Papernot
et al., 2017) and find both our 01 loss models (linear and
non-linear) to be more robust than hinge and logistic.
We find that on separable image datasets like MNIST our
model offers little advantage and demonstrate under simula-
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tion why this happens. We then conduct adversarial training
of our linear model and show it increases its robustness on
MNIST and all other datasets while retaining clean test ac-
curacy. We also show applications to deter street sign and
facial recognition adversarial attacks. We describe below
our methods followed by results and discussion.
2. Methods
2.1. Background
The problem of determining the hyperplane with minimum
number of misclassifications in a binary classification prob-
lem is known to be NP-hard (Ben-David et al., 2003). In
mainstream machine learning literature this is called mini-
mizing the 01 loss (Shai et al., 2011) as given in Objective 1,
1
2n
argmin
w,w0
∑
i
(1− sign(yi(wTxi + w0))) (1)
where w ∈ Rd, w0 ∈ R is our hyperplane solution, and
xi ∈ Rd, yi ∈ {+1,−1}.∀i = 0...n − 1 are our training
data. Popular linear classifiers such as the linear support vec-
tor machine, perceptron, and logistic regression (Alpaydin,
2004) can be considered as convex approximations to this
problem that yield fast gradient descent solutions (Bartlett
et al., 2004). However, they are also more sensitive to out-
liers than the 01 loss (Bartlett et al., 2004; Nguyen & Sanner,
2013; Xie et al., 2019).
We extend the 01 loss to a simple single hidden layer neural
network with k hidden nodes and sign activation that we
call the MLP01 loss. This objective can be given as
1
2n
argmin
W,W0,u,u0
∑
i
(1−sign(yi(uT (sign(WTxi+W0))+u0)))
(2)
where W ∈ Rd×k, W0 ∈ Rk are the hidden layer
parameters, u ∈ Rk, u0 ∈ R are the final layer
node parameters, xi ∈ Rd, yi ∈ {+1,−1}.∀i =
0...n − 1 are our training data, and sign(v ∈ Rk) =
(sign(v0), sign(v1), ..., sign(vk−1)).
We solve both problems with stochastic coordinate descent
based upon earlier work (Xie et al., 2019).
Other work on 01 loss solvers Aside from the stochastic
coordinate descent (Xie et al., 2019) that we build upon other
attempts have been made to optimize the 0/1 loss. These
include boosting (Zhai et al., 2013), integer programming
(Tang et al., 2014), an approximation algorithm (Shalev-
Shwartz et al., 2011), a random coordinate descent method
(Li & Lin, 2007), and a branch and bound method that is
the most recent from 2013 (Nguyen & Sanner, 2013). The
above previous works cover various strategies to solve 01
loss but lack on-par test accuracy with convex solvers on real
data. We obtained a Matlab implementation of the branch
and bound method and found it to be slow - it did not finish
after several hours of runtime, as also cautioned by authors
in their code. The random coordinate descent code (Li &
Lin, 2007) requires GNU C compiler (gcc) version 3.0 to
compile whereas current supported versions are above 4.0.
2.2. Stochastic coordinate descent (SCD01)
We use the stochastic coordinate descent for 01 loss (Xie
et al., 2019) called SCD01 to drive our linear and non-linear
01 loss solvers. In the Supplementary Material we fully
describe the algorithm for reference including the optimal
threshold algorithm. Briefly, we iteratively randomly select
a subset of the training data in each epoch and run coor-
dinate descent in each iteration. Our coordinate descent
shown in Algorithm 1 differs from previous work in how we
update the coordinates. In previous work (Xie et al., 2019)
authors update each coordinate until there is no change in
the objective. We randomly update a pool of coordinates by
one step and pick the one with the greatest decrease in the
objective (with ties decided randomly).
2.3. Single hidden layer 01 loss network (MLP01)
We extend the stochastic coordinate descent solver to a
single hidden layer network with k hidden nodes that we
call MLP01 (see Algorithm 2). For each random batch of
the training data we train the final node followed by each
hidden node using our Coordinate Descent algorithm above
(Algorithm 1). We set 20 hidden nodes (h = 20) in our
experiments.
2.4. Majority vote 01 loss
Due to the non-uniqueness of 01 loss and randomness of
our solvers both our methods will return different solutions
when initialized with different seeds for the random number
generator. Thus we take the majority vote of multiple runs
which we see as inherently necessary due to the nature of
01 loss. We call our methods SCD01majvote that has 100
votes and MLPmajvote that has 32 votes (input rr = 32 in
Algorithm 2).
2.5. Adversarial training SCD01
We apply the basic iterative adversarial training described
earlier (Kurakin et al., 2016) to our SCD01 algorithm. The
adversarial training objective is actually a min-max objec-
tive: we minimize the empirical risk across the maximum
distortion of the input data. The iterative training that has
been proposed earlier and used by us below is a heuristic to
the min-max problem.
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Algorithm 1 Coordinate descent
Input: Data (feature vectors) xi ∈ Rd for i = 0..n − 1 with
labels yi ∈ {+1,−1}, winc ∈ R (set to 0.17 by default), size of
pooled features to update k (set to 128 by default), vector w ∈ Rd
and w0 ∈ R
Output: Vector w ∈ Rd and w0 ∈ R
Procedure:
1. Initialization: If w is null then let each feature wi of w be
uniformly drawn from (−1, 1). We set ‖w‖ = 1 and throughout
our search ensure that ‖w‖ = 1 by renormalizing each time w
changes.
2. Let the number of misclassified points with negative
wTxi be errorminus = 0 and those with positive wTxi be
errorplus = 0. These are later used in the Optimal Thresh-
old algorithm called Opt (see Supplementary Material) for fast
update of our objective.
3. Compute the initial data projection wTxi, ∀i = 0..n − 1,
sort the projection with insertion sort, and initialize (w0, obj) =
Opt(wTx, y, 0, n − 1). We also record the value of j for the
optimal w0 = (wTxj + wTxj+1)/2.
4. Set prevobj =∞.
while prevobj − obj > 0 do
Set prevobj = obj
Randomly pick k of the d feature indices.
for all selected features wi we update them do
1. Assume the optimal w0 = (wTxj + wTxj+1)/2
2. Set start = wTxj−10 and end = wTxj+10
3. Modify coordinatewi bywinc, compute data projection
wTxi∀i = 0..n− 1, and sort the projection with insertion
sort
4. Set (w0, obj) = Opt(wTx, y, start, end) and record
this value for feature wi
5. Reset w0 to try the next coordinate
end for
Pick the coordinate whose update gives the largest decrease
in the objective and set (w0, obj) to the values given by the
best coordinate with ties decided randomly.
end while
2.6. Black box adversarial attack
Since the 01 loss model has no gradient we cannot use white
box gradient based attacks. Instead we resort to a black box
strategy that uses the gradient of a substitute model to gen-
erate adversaries (Papernot et al., 2017). In this setting we
start with a small subset of the test data (200 samples) from
which we iteratively learn the substitute model parameters.
In each iteration (epoch) we generate adversaries from the
remaining test and attack the target model. This strategy
can be effective as long as the substitute model is at least as
accurate on the test data as the target model. This indicates
that the substitute model is accurately modeling the target
model at least on the samples it is trained upon and so its
gradient is likely to produce effective adversaries.
For the substitute model we use a two hidden layer neural
network each with 200 nodes per layer as in previous work
(Galloway et al., 2017). We implement this using the mul-
tilayer perceptron class in the Python scikit-learn toolkit
(Pedregosa et al., 2011). In the Supplementary Material
we fully describe our black box attack model. We set the
distortion in the adversarial images to  = 0.0625 for CI-
FAR10, STL10, ImageNet and  = 0.3 for MNIST. In the
Supplementary Material we provide results for lower values
of  and see similar results as here.
3. Results
We study all methods for the task of binary classification
of classes 0 and 1 on four popular image classification
benchmarks. We compare our 01 loss methods to their
convex counterparts on each benchmark. We run the Lin-
earSVC algorithm (SVM) in Python scikit-learn toolkit
(Pedregosa et al., 2011) with cross-validated C. We use
Algorithm 2 Stochastic coordinate descent for single hidden
layer 01 loss network
Input: Data (feature vectors) xi ∈ Rd with labels yi ∈
{+1,−1}, number of hidden nodes h (set to 20 by default), num-
ber of votes rr ∈ N (Natural numbers), number of iterations per
vote it ∈ N (set to 2000 by default), batch size as a percent of
training data p ∈ [0, 1] (set to 0.75 by default) , winc ∈ R (set to
0.1 by default) and winc2 ∈ R (set to 0.02)
Output: Total of rr sets of (bestW ∈ Rk×d, bestW0 ∈
Rk, bestu ∈ Rk, bestu0 ∈ R) after each vote
Procedure:
1. Initialize all network weights W,u to random values from
the uniform distribution (−1, 1).
2. Set network thresholds W0 and u0 to the median projection
value on their corresponding weight vectors.
while j < rr do
Set bestW = null, bestW0 = null, bestw =
null, bestw0 = null, bestloss =∞
for i = 0 to it do
Randomly pick p percent of rows as input training data.
Run the Coordinate Descent Algorithm 1 for the final
output node u to completion starting with the values of
u and u0 from the previous call to it (if i == 0 we set
u = null).
for k = 0 to h do
Run the Coordinate Descent Algorithm 1 to completion
starting with the values of wk (kth column in W ) and
wk0 (kth entry in W0) from the previous call to it (if
i == 0 we set wk = null).
end for
Calculate Objective 2 on the full input training set
if objective(W,W0, u, u0) <
objective(bestW, bestW0, bestu, bestu0) then
Set bestW = W , bestW0 = W0,
bestu = u, bestu0 = u0, and bestloss =
objective(bestW, bestW0, bestu, bestu0)
end if
end for
Output (bestW , bestW0, bestu, bestu0)
Set j = j + 1.
end while
We output all sets of (bestW, bestW0, bestu, bestu0) across
the votes. We can use the first set or the majority vote of all sets
for predictions.
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the Python scikit-learn multilayer perceptron with logis-
tic loss (MLP) and one hidden layer of 20 the same as
the MLP01 network. We train our MLP with stochastic
gradient descent and learning parameters set to optimize
the cross-validation accuracy. We also study a majority
vote SVM and MLP by running them a 100 times on boot-
strapped samples (bagging) and find no improvement in
robustness compared to the single runs. We obtained the
previous stochastic coordinate descent 01 loss solver (Xie
et al., 2019) that we compare to our new one. All of our code
and data are freely available from our GitHub site https:
//github.com/zero-one-loss/01loss.
Algorithm 3 Iterative adversarial training for SCD01
Input: Model vector w ∈ Rd and w0 ∈ R from SCD01, data
(feature vectors) xi ∈ Rd with labels yi ∈ {+1,−1} for i =
0..n− 1
Output: 100 adversarially trained models (w′, w′0)
Procedure:
for each of 100 iterations do
Randomly select 10% of the input training examples and
produce adversaries for each selected datapoint
for each datapoint xi do
Obtain prediction of xi as y′i = w
Txi + w0
Create adversary x′i = xi + (−y′i) w||w||
end for
Run SCD01 on the clean plus adversarial samples selected
above starting the search from w in the previous iteration.
end for
We now have 100 SCD01 models on the clean (xi) plus adver-
sarial (x′i) examples
return (all 100 (w′, w′0) for majority vote output)
3.1. CIFAR10, STL10, and ImageNet
We start with results for binary classification of classes 0
and 1 in CIFAR10, STL10, and ImageNet. Between classes
0 and 1 we have in CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky, 2009) we have
10,000 32× 32× 3 training images and 2000 test ones and
in STL10 (Coates et al., 2011) we have 1000 96× 96× 3
training images and 1600 test. In ImageNet classes 0 and
1 contain about 2580 256 × 256 × 3 training images and
100 test ones. We change the split so as to increase the test
data size so that we can better train the black box attack
substitute model. We divide the training set into two parts:
the first containing 1280 for training and 1300 for test.
In Figure 1 we see that both our linear SCD01 and non-
linear MLP01 models have comparable accuracy to the lin-
ear SVM and non-linear MLP but are much more robust. In
Figure 2 we show clean and adversarial images generated
by attacking MLP01, MLP, and SVM. We show adversarial
images that are correctly classified by MLP01 and wrongly
by MLP and SVM.
3.2. MNIST and simulation
While the above benchmarks are focused on image classifi-
cation of arbitrary objects the MNIST benchmark focuses
Epoch SCD01majvote SVM MLP01majvote MLP
0 .83 .82 .86 .89
20 .34 0 .59 .06
Epoch SCD01majvote SVM MLP01majvote MLP
0 .8 .76 .82 .82
20 .51 .03 .61 .15
Epoch SCD01majvote SVM MLP01majvote MLP
0 .74 .66 .77 .73
20 .32 .02 .57 .28
Figure 1. Accuracy of adversarial samples generated at each epoch
during substitute model training on CIFAR10, STL10, and Ima-
geNet. At epoch 0 we have the accuracy of the target model on
clean test data (without adversaries) as shown in the tables.
on digit classification and is easier in comparison. Its test
accuracy is typically above 99% for most classifiers. Be-
tween classes 0 and 1 (also digits 0 and 1) we have 12,665
training images and 2115 test images each of size 28× 28.
In Figure 3 we see that SCD01 is not as robust as SVM and
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Clean MLP01 majvote MLP SVM
Figure 2. Clean images from CIFAR10 (top row), STL10 (mid
row), and ImageNet (bottom row) and adversarial images obtained
by attacking MLP01, MLP, and SVM with  = 0.0625. The ad-
versarial images shown here fool SVM and MLP but are correctly
classified by MLP01.
Epoch SCD01majvote SVM MLP01majvote MLP
0 1 1 1 1
20 .26 .34 .42 .43
Figure 3. Accuracy of adversarial samples on MNIST (see Figure 1
caption for more)
MLP01 is the same as MLP. We conjecture that this may be
due to non-uniqueness of 01 loss on easily separable classes
like we see in MNIST. To understand this better we turn to
simulated data.
In Figure 4 we show SCD01 and SVM boundaries on sim-
ple and complex simulated datasets. On the simple dataset
(shown in Figure 4(a) and (b)) we see that the SCD01 bound-
ary is close to one class whereas the SVM is centered to
maximize the margin. This is due to the non-uniqueness
of the 01 loss function. There are infinite solutions on the
simple dataset and the search ends as soon as the loss value
becomes zero. On the complex dataset however both SCD01
and SVM boundaries are similar.
We conjecture that attacking SCD01 on a simple dataset
would be easy because a convex substitute model (such as
(a) SCD01 simple (b) SVM simple
(c) SCD01 complex (d) SVM complex
(e)
Figure 4. SCD01 and linear SVM boundaries on simple separable
data in (a) and (b), and the same boundaries on complex data in (c)
and (d). In (e) we show the accuracy of adversarial samples gener-
ated at each epoch during substitute model training on the simple
and complex datasets. As before at epoch 0 we have the accuracy
of the target model on clean test data (without adversaries).
MLP and SVM) would have a boundary similar to the SVM.
Thus adversaries from its boundary are likely to succeed in
attacking SCD01 whose boundary lies close to one class.
Indeed we see in Figure 4(e) that SCD01 falls from 100%
to 50% accuracy on the simple dataset after the first epoch
of the black box attack whereas SVM remains at 100%.
We now consider adversarial training to improve SCD01’s
robustness particularly on simple MNIST type datasets.
3.3. Adversarial training
In order to increase the robustness of SCD01 we run Al-
gorithm 3 starting with a single run SCD01 trained on the
full training dataset. We then take the majority vote of all
100 classifiers learnt in each iteration. We also run the same
algorithm by replacing SCD01 with SVM and instead of
voting across all 100 we use just the final model as is typical
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in adversarial training (Kurakin et al., 2016). We find the
adversarially trained SCD01 is more robust than SCD01
and SCD01 majvote on all datasets while retaining clean
test accuracy. In Figure 5 we see the adversarially trained
SCD01 on MNIST and CIFAR10 outperforms the versions
trained on the clean data. It is comparable to the adversari-
ally trained SVM on MNIST  = 0.3 and better on MNIST
 = 0.2 and CIFAR10.
Figure 5. Accuracy of adversarial samples after iterative adversar-
ial training on MNIST with two different distortions and CIFAR10
3.4. Transferability of adversaries between 01 and
convex loss
Adversarial samples are known to transfer between classi-
fiers (Papernot et al., 2016a). We find this is not so true
for 01 loss adversaries. In Table 1 we see that adversaries
targeting MLP01 also attack MLP and SVM but to a lower
extent than if we attacked MLP and SVM directly as the
target model. Adversaries produced by attacking MLP and
Table 1. Transferability of black box adversaries between 01 and
convex loss in CIFAR10 and STL10 (both  = 0.0625)
CIFAR10
ADVERSARIAL BLACK BOX TARGET MODEL
ACCURACY OF MODEL MLP01 (32 VOTES) MLP SVM
MLP01 (32 VO.) 59.7% 55.8% 60.8%
MLP 52% 8.1% 8.4%
SVM 32.3% 1.8% 0.17%
STL10
ADVERSARIAL BLACK BOX TARGET MODEL
ACCURACY OF MODEL MLP01 (32 VOTES) MLP SVM
MLP01 (32 VO.) 60.5% 58.5% 64.93%
MLP 52.9% 14.9% 13.1%
SVM 46.6% 7.2% 2.5%
SVM transfer between each other but not to MLP01.
3.5. Runtimes, stability, and comparison to prior work
In Table 2 we see that our solver with majority vote is
considerably faster than the previous one (Xie et al., 2019)
(100 votes) but still slower than the convex counterparts.
These are measured on Intel Xeon Silver 4114 CPUs with
NVIDIA Titan RTX 2080 GPUs.
Table 2. Runtimes of prior work (Xie et al., 2019) denoted by
PREV-SCD01 and our methods shown in hours
DATA PREV-SCD01 SCD01 MLP01 SVM MLP
100 VOTES 100 VOTES 32 VOTES
CIFAR10 13.94 1.74 2.57 0.003 0.01
STL10 12.23 1.38 0.71 0.004 0.008
MNIST 3.1 0.26 0.68 3E-4 0.001
We compare the adversarial accuracy of the previous 01
loss solver to ours on CIFAR10 and STL10 and find the
robustness to be similar (see Supplementary Material for
graph). This further supports our hypothesis of 01 loss
robustness over convex ones since we see a high robustness
across two different 01 loss solvers. In Table 3 we see
that both SCD01 and MLP01 majority vote on the test data
have low deviation suggesting that our results are stable and
reproducible.
Table 3. Mean and standard deviation of 100 votes of SCD01 and
32 votes of MLP01
SCD01 (100 VOTES) MLP01 (32 VOTES)
STL10 CIFAR10 MNIST STL10 CIFAR10 MNIST
MEAN .75 .81 .99 .76 .83 .99
STD DEV .008 .005 8E-3 .01 .006 8E-3
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3.6. Applications: street sign and facial recognition
adversarial attacks
We now turn to two practical problems where adversarial
attacks pose a problem. First is the task of street sign de-
tection by autonomous vehicles (Sitawarin et al., 2018) and
the second is facial recognition that are used by government
and security systems. We consider 2816 train and 900 test
48× 48× 3 images of street signs of 60 and 120 mph from
the GTSRB street sign dataset (Stallkamp et al., 2011) and
1000 train and 1000 test 96× 96× 3 images of brown and
black hair individuals from the CelebA facial recognition
benchmark (Liu et al., 2015). For GTSRB we use a pertur-
bation of  = 0.03125 and for CelebA we use  = 0.0625
in the black box attack. We show other values of  in the
Supplementary Material and make similar observations as
here. In Figure 6 we see that the MLP01 attains comparable
accuracy to SVM and MLP but is more robust as we saw in
earlier benchmarks. We show sample adversarial images in
Figure 7.
Epoch MLP01majvote SVM MLP
0 .98 .99 .98
20 .35 .24 .24
Epoch MLP01majvote SVM MLP
0 .79 .76 .78
20 .37 0 .02
Figure 6. Accuracy of adversarial samples on GTSRB and CelebA
(see Figure 1 caption for more)
Clean MLP01 majvote MLP SVM
Figure 7. Images from CelebA in the top row and GTSRB in the
bottom one (see Figure 2 caption for more)
4. Discussion
Our results show that a convex substitute model (like the
multilayer perceptron that we use) can generate effective
adversaries for other convex ones like SVM and MLP but
not so much on 01 loss like our SCD01 and MLP01. We
ask two follow-up questions. (1) Can we attack the 01
loss with a 01 loss substitute model? (2) Was the multilayer
perceptron substitute model in the black box attack correctly
trained? To answer the first question we use SCD01 as the
substitute model in our black box attack.
Figure 8. Accuracy of adversarial samples generated at each epoch
during SCD01 substitute model training on CIFAR10 with distor-
tion  = 1. At epoch 0 we have the accuracy of the target model on
clean test data (without adversaries). Also shown is the accuracy
of the SCD01 substitute model on test samples during training to
confirm that the substitute model has test accuracy comparable to
the target model.
In Figure 8 we see the results of attacking SCD01 and SVM
with SCD01 as the substitute model in the black box attack.
We use the same seed for the random number generator in
SCD01 both for the target and substitute model to avoid
differences due to randomness. We don’t use the majority
vote and attack a single run of SCD01.
We see that the black box attack with SCD01 as the sub-
stitute model fails to attack any of the models even though
the accuracy of the substitute on test data is high during
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training and the distortion is set to a high value of  = 1.
We argue this is because of its non-unique nature: there can
be infinite solutions all yielding the same local minimum in
the 01 loss search space. Thus when we attempt to learn an
SCD01 single vote model to generate adversaries we find it
cannot even approximate and successfully attack the same
SCD01 trained on clean data with the same random number
generator seed as the substitute.
Of course we can attack SCD01 if we know its model pa-
rameters (w,w0). We simply generate adversaries with
x′i = xi + (−y′i) w||w|| and these will fool the SCD01 single
vote. In Table 4 we see that the SCD01 adversaries gener-
ated in this way fool the SCD01 classifier and also transfer
over to the SVM to some degree. This would be a white
box attack though. If the model parameters are kept hidden
or retrained we see that both convex and 01 loss substitute
models find it hard to attack 01 loss.
Table 4. Accuracy of adversarial examples produced by the SCD01
w vector in CIFAR10 (white box attack). In parenthesis are test
data accuracies without adversaries.
ATTACK MODEL SCD01 SVM MLP01 MLP
SCD01 (WHITE BOX) .19 (.83) .79 (.82) .86 (.86) .87 (.89)
For the second question we look at the accuracy of our multi-
layer perceptron substitute model in each epoch of the black
box attack. An accurately trained substitute model indicates
that our training was successful and its gradient is likely to
be an effective generator of adversaries. Indeed we see in
Figure 9 that the black box substitute model accuracy while
attacking SCD01, MLP01, SVM, and MLP on CIFAR10
are similar to the clean test accuracies of the target model
suggesting we have a well-trained substitute. We see the
same trend on all datasets.
Figure 9. Accuracy of the substitute model on CIFAR10 while
attacking SCD01, MLP01, SVM, and MLP
We have shown that substitute model black box attacks are
not so effective against 01 loss models when the substitute
model is convex or 01 loss. There are however other black
box attack methods that rely on just labels and try to esti-
mate the minimum distortion of adversarial examples (an
NP-hard problem) (Chen et al., 2017; Brendel et al., 2017;
Chen et al., 2019). We obtained the implementations of the
Boundary Attack (Brendel et al., 2017) and HopSkipJump
attack (Chen et al., 2019) to determine the minimum adver-
sarial distortion of our SCD01 boundary. Both of these start
with an adversarial example and make incremental changes
until the example is just at the boundary of the target model.
In our initial attempts we found both codes to crash before
reaching convergence or their default maximum iterations
when we attack our SCD01 and SCD01 majvote models.
While we need to revisit the attacks both are slow even for
a single example. This is not surprising since finding the
minimum distortion is an NP-hard problem and thus hard to
solve in practice.
We measure the L2 distances between adversarial and clean
images shown in Figure 2 plus the Celeba images in Figure 7
and average them: MLP01=11.54, MLP=11.5, SVM=11.5.
Thus despite MLP01 adversaries have a higher distortion
they are still correctly classified by MLP01.
We have not shown the effect of different parameters on
SCD01 and MLP01 because our focus here is on adversarial
attacks on 01 loss. We determined our parameters by op-
timizing accuracy on the test dataset and then fix them for
the adversarial attacks. While our SCD01 and MLP01 are
possibly the fastest 01 solvers that we know of, our runtimes
are still higher than SVM and MLP. Thus speeding up our
algorithms by parallelization is a key part of future work.
There are several other future avenues we could explore
going forward. The first is multi-class classification so we
can evaluate 01 loss on full image benchmarks. In previous
work (Xie et al., 2019) a one-vs-one strategy of 10 votes
showed promising but limited results. We instead plan to
add more nodes to the final layer of MLP01 and rely on ma-
jority vote for classification. Even though our results here
are for classes 0 and 1 we expect similar trends on other
pairs of classes in the benchmarks. Besides a multi-class net-
work we may explore 01 loss convolutions in an attempt to
match the accuracy of convolutional neural networks. This
is computationally significantly hard but perhaps possible
by extending the stochastic coordinate descent like we have
in this study.
We briefly touch upon adversarial training in this paper
and plan to explore it separately. In particular we plan
to study adversarially trained SVM and MLP, and explore
iterative training for SCD01 more thoroughly. It is unclear
how to generate white box adversaries for MLP01 and so
a naive iterative training like we did for SCD01 will not
work there. One strategy is to use gradient free black box
attacks but runtime may be a problem. If we can successfully
adversarially train MLP01 it may become more robust than
what we demonstrate here.
Robust binary classification with the 01 loss
References
Alpaydin, E. Machine Learning. MIT Press, 2004.
Bartlett, P. L., Jordan, M. I., and Mcauliffe, J. D. Large mar-
gin classifiers: Convex loss, low noise, and convergence
rates. In Thrun, S., Saul, L., and Scho¨lkopf, B. (eds.),
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 16,
pp. 1173–1180. MIT Press, 2004.
Ben-David, S., Eiron, N., and Long, P. M. On the difficulty
of approximately maximizing agreements. Journal of
Computer and System Sciences, 66(3):496–514, 2003.
Brendel, W., Rauber, J., and Bethge, M. Decision-based ad-
versarial attacks: Reliable attacks against black-box ma-
chine learning models. arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.04248,
2017.
Carlini, N. and Wagner, D. Towards evaluating the robust-
ness of neural networks. In 2017 IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy (SP), pp. 39–57. IEEE, 2017.
Chen, J., Jordan, M. I., and Wainwright, M. J. Hop-
skipjumpattack: A query-efficient decision-based attack.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1904.02144, 3, 2019.
Chen, P.-Y., Zhang, H., Sharma, Y., Yi, J., and Hsieh, C.-
J. Zoo: Zeroth order optimization based black-box at-
tacks to deep neural networks without training substitute
models. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Workshop on
Artificial Intelligence and Security, pp. 15–26, 2017.
Coates, A., Ng, A., and Lee, H. An analysis of single-
layer networks in unsupervised feature learning. In Pro-
ceedings of the fourteenth international conference on
artificial intelligence and statistics, pp. 215–223, 2011.
Cortes, C. and Vapnik, V. Support-vector networks. Ma-
chine learning, 20(3):273–297, 1995.
Galloway, A., Taylor, G. W., and Moussa, M. At-
tacking binarized neural networks. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1711.00449, 2017.
Ghosh, A., Manwani, N., and Sastry, P. Making risk min-
imization tolerant to label noise. Neurocomputing, 160:
93–107, 2015.
Goodfellow, I. J., Shlens, J., and Szegedy, C. Explain-
ing and harnessing adversarial examples. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1412.6572, 2014.
Hu, W., Niu, G., Sato, I., and Sugiyama, M. Does distribu-
tionally robust supervised learning give robust classifiers?
arXiv preprint arXiv:1611.02041, 2016.
Krizhevsky, A. Learning multiple layers of features from
tiny images. 2009.
Krizhevsky, A., Sutskever, I., and Hinton, G. E. Imagenet
classification with deep convolutional neural networks.
In Advances in neural information processing systems,
pp. 1097–1105, 2012.
Kurakin, A., Goodfellow, I., and Bengio, S. Adversarial ma-
chine learning at scale. arXiv preprint arXiv:1611.01236,
2016.
Li, L. and Lin, H.-T. Optimizing 0/1 loss for perceptrons by
random coordinate descent. In Neural Networks, 2007.
IJCNN 2007. International Joint Conference on, pp. 749–
754. IEEE, 2007.
Liu, Z., Luo, P., Wang, X., and Tang, X. Deep learning face
attributes in the wild. In Proceedings of International
Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV), December 2015.
Lyu, Y. and Tsang, I. W. Curriculum loss: Robust learn-
ing and generalization against label corruption. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1905.10045, 2019.
Manwani, N. and Sastry, P. Noise tolerance under risk
minimization. IEEE transactions on cybernetics, 43(3):
1146–1151, 2013.
Nguyen, T. and Sanner, S. Algorithms for direct 0–1 loss
optimization in binary classification. In Proceedings of
The 30th International Conference on Machine Learning,
pp. 1085–1093, 2013.
Papernot, N., McDaniel, P., and Goodfellow, I. Transfer-
ability in machine learning: from phenomena to black-
box attacks using adversarial samples. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1605.07277, 2016a.
Papernot, N., McDaniel, P., Jha, S., Fredrikson, M., Celik,
Z. B., and Swami, A. The limitations of deep learning in
adversarial settings. In 2016 IEEE European Symposium
on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P), pp. 372–387. IEEE,
2016b.
Papernot, N., McDaniel, P., Goodfellow, I., Jha, S., Celik,
Z. B., and Swami, A. Practical black-box attacks against
machine learning. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on
Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Se-
curity, pp. 506–519. ACM, 2017.
Pedregosa, F., Varoquaux, G., Gramfort, A., Michel, V.,
Thirion, B., Grisel, O., Blondel, M., Prettenhofer, P.,
Weiss, R., Dubourg, V., Vanderplas, J., Passos, A., Cour-
napeau, D., Brucher, M., Perrot, M., and Duchesnay, E.
Scikit-learn: Machine learning in Python. Journal of
Machine Learning Research, 12:2825–2830, 2011.
Raghunathan, A., Xie, S. M., Yang, F., Duchi, J. C., and
Liang, P. Adversarial training can hurt generalization.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1906.06032, 2019.
Robust binary classification with the 01 loss
Shai, S.-S., Shamir, O., and Sridharan, K. Learning linear
and kernel predictors with the 0-1 loss function. IJCAI
Proceedings-International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, 22(3), 2011.
Shalev-Shwartz, S., Shamir, O., and Sridharan, K. Learning
linear and kernel predictors with the 0-1 loss function,
2011.
Sitawarin, C., Bhagoji, A. N., Mosenia, A., Chiang, M., and
Mittal, P. Darts: Deceiving autonomous cars with toxic
signs. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.06430, 2018.
Stallkamp, J., Schlipsing, M., Salmen, J., and Igel, C. The
German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark: A multi-
class classification competition. In IEEE International
Joint Conference on Neural Networks, pp. 1453–1460,
2011.
Szegedy, C., Zaremba, W., Sutskever, I., Bruna, J., Erhan,
D., Goodfellow, I., and Fergus, R. Intriguing properties of
neural networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199, 2013.
Tang, Y., Li, X., Xu, Y., Liu, S., and Ouyang, S. A mixed
integer programming approach to maximum margin 0–1
loss classification. In 2014 International Radar Confer-
ence, pp. 1–6. IEEE, 2014.
Xie, M., Xue, Y., and Roshan, U. Stochastic coordinate de-
scent for 0/1 loss and its sensitivity to adversarial attacks.
In Proceedings of 18th IEEE International Conference
on Machine Learning and Applications - ICMLA 2019,
pp. to appear, 2019.
Zhai, S., Xia, T., Tan, M., and Wang, S. Direct 0-1 loss
minimization and margin maximization with boosting. In
Burges, C., Bottou, L., Welling, M., Ghahramani, Z., and
Weinberger, K. (eds.), Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems 26, pp. 872–880. Curran Associates,
Inc., 2013.
Zhang, H., Yu, Y., Jiao, J., Xing, E. P., Ghaoui, L. E., and Jor-
dan, M. I. Theoretically principled trade-off between ro-
bustness and accuracy. arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.08573,
2019.
